The Malaysian Government has liberalised its restrictions on foreign equity ownership in local companies to enhance the country's competitiveness against regional neighbours in attracting more FDI inflows. With an overall panel of 4,176 firm-year observations drawn from a sample of 348 Malaysia-listed companies over the period 1999-2010, fixed-effect panel data regression found that percentage of foreign equity ownership, appointment of foreign chairman and appointment of foreign chief executive director did not have any significant relationship with firm's return on equity (ROE). However, increase in percentage of foreign directors sitting on a company's board significantly improved ROE. Besides, only when foreign investors have dominant (above 50%) voting rights, ROE increased. After categorised firm-year observations into five SIC-defined sectors, manufacturing sector sub-panel yielded similar results as overall panel. In contrast to overall panel, construction and wholesale trade sectors sub-panels showed the appointments of foreign chairman and foreign chief executive director negatively influenced ROE.
Introduction
Academic scholars and government policymakers share the same opinion that inward foreign direct investment (FDI) plays a crucial role in capital formation and economic development, particularly in developing and emerging economies (De Mello, 1997; Gorg and Greenaway, 2004; Aggarwal et al., 2005) . Since early 1990s, Southeast Asia has been one of the most attractive regions of FDI inflows, due to abundance of natural resources and relatively cheaper factors of production. Table A1 in the Appendix reveals that Singapore is by far the highest ranked Southeast Asia country in terms of accumulated stock of inward FDI as at the end of year 2009 (ranked 16th in the world), followed by Thailand (34th), Malaysia (35th), Indonesia (41st), Vietnam (48th) and Philippines (60th) . This is unsurprising because Singapore does not impose any restriction on foreign equity ownership (FOWN) and does not experience any political instability ever since its independence, unlike some of its regional neighbours. Realising the important contribution of inward FDI in the era of globalisation and intensified competition, Malaysian government, alike other Southeast Asian counterparts, has liberalised the regulations on FOWN in their local companies.
In Malaysia, Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) has allowed foreign investors to hold up to 100% of a firm's equity in all manufacturing sectors during the period from 31st July 1998 to 31st December 2003, except for seven specified manufacturing activities. Prior to this, Industrial Coordination Act 1975 had capped FOWN in a company at 30%. Subsequently, in June 2003, Malaysia Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) permitted 100% foreign ownership on a permanent basis (Rajenthran, 2002) .
Growing trend of globalisation and business expansion by multinational corporations (MNCs) has prompted more studies on foreign ownership structure in developed economies such as the UK (Harris, 2002) and Japan (Kimura and Kiyota, 2007) , as well as developing and emerging economies such as Zimbabwe, Ghana and Kenya (Ramachandran and Shah, 1998) , India (Chhibber and Majumdar, 1999) , Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru (Pressman, 2004) , China (Greenaway et al., 2009) and Indonesia (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; Takii, 2004) . However, similar studies on Malaysian listed companies were very limited. Although study by Detragiache and Gupta (2004) is the nearest study of foreign ownership in Malaysia, nevertheless it is conducted on banks rather than non-financial firms. Their study found that foreign banks long-established in Malaysia are more profitable than domestic-owned Malaysian banks due to higher net interest margins and lower non-performing loans (NPLs) that results from better credit risk management. In Malaysia, foreign ownership in banking and finance sector is regulated separately by Bank Negara Malaysia, its central bank, rather than MIDA. Foreign ownership in banking and finance sector is restricted to 70%, but 100% foreign ownership is allowed for Islamic financial institutions establishment due to government's effort to make Malaysia the main Islamic financial centre in the world.
Besides providing some new empirical evidence on the effect of FOWN on firm's profitability in Malaysia, this paper also aims to explore on whether the appointments of foreign chairman (FCHM) and foreign chief executive director as well as the presence of foreign directors (FDIR) on the company's board of directors influence firm's profitability. Most of the previous studies of foreign ownership structure have overlooked the possibility that executive directors who actually control the daily operations and strategic decision makings might have maximised personal wealth at the expense of shareholders. Studies carried out by Chien (2008) in Taiwan and Masulis et al. (2009) 
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With various competing theories of how foreign ownership and presence of FDIR affect firm performance, empirical evidences from previous studies were somehow mixed. Internalisation theory, resource-based theory and upper echelon theory generally predict positive influence, whereas agency theory and rescue acquisition hypothesis predict the opposite. Internalisation theory developed by Buckley and Casson (1976) explained that MNCs will benefit from creating their own internal market where intra-group transactions can be carried out at lower cost and hence increase profit. Generally, local firms are more knowledgeable about local market, consumer preferences and business practices, thus foreign owners must possess some specific advantages such as managerial expertise or technological advancement in order to be able to compete with them. These intangible assets will be transferred through internalisation and expansion abroad, leading to higher profitability and productivity of foreign-owned firms compared to domestic-owned firms in a host country. Blomström and Kokko (1998) supported internalisation theory, where they concluded that transfer of technology from foreign owners had contributed to higher operating efficiency of domestic firms, through introduction of new know-how and transfer of techniques for inventory and quality controls. However, Pfaffermayr and Bellak (2000) study found only an insignificant difference between foreign-owned and domestic-owned manufacturing MNCs. They explained that foreign ownership per se does not matter for firm's profitability, but rather it is the belonging to a global enterprise network which can optimally exploit firm-specific assets that matters.
According to Barney (1991) , a firm's competitive advantage is based on the possession of tangible and intangible resources, which are difficult or costly for other firms to obtain or imitate, non-substitutable and valuable. In today's globalise business environment, a firm's access to valuable resources such as cheaper cost of capital, larger customer base, reliable suppliers and strategic business partners could be enhanced through personal networks of its foreign owners and FDIR. Study by Pfaffermayr and Bellak (2000) found that foreign-owned firms generally possess greater amount of financial capital than domestic-owned firms, thus more likely to set up research and development department to develop better innovative products which suit consumers' needs at greater production efficiency, hence resulting in higher profitability. Foreignowned firms also tend to have more high-calibre human capital by virtue of rewarding their expertise with higher salary and better perks. Besides, Masulis et al. (2009) believed that FDIR could offer valuable international experience, expertise and advice, especially to those firms that have significant foreign operations and plans for overseas expansion, leading to better firm performance.
Upper echelon theory can be adopted to relate the presence of Foreign executive directors FEXDs and firm performance. Liargovas and Skandalis (2010) showed that a heterogeneous board that consists of different races and nationalities will be more creative and eventually contribute to better strategic planning and business decision making as compared to a homogeneous board. Besides, Choi and Hasan (2005) study on Korean commercial banks over the period 1999 to 2002 found that FDIR are more knowledgeable and experienced about competition and latest development in the global market compared to local directors, and thus has helped local banks to increase revenue by venturing into new businesses and reduce the reliance on traditional businesses. However, studies by Williams and O'Reilly (1998) that claimed board diversity can give rise to group conflict and Tsui and O'Reilly (1992) that concluded ethnic diversity reduces organisational commitment and communication, are both argued against the upper echelon theory and supported a negative relationship between the presence of FDIR and firm performance.
Agency problem which prevails in many corporations due to separation of ownership and control could potentially be reduced with shareholders appointing the board of directors to whom managers reporting to. However, according to Madura (2010) , MNCs with foreign subsidiaries and affiliates are likely to incur larger agency costs than domestic firms due to far distance and cultural variation between home and host countries as well as greater transaction volumes arising from worldwide businesses. On this premise, agency cost is likely to increase with foreign ownership, which in turn negatively influences the performance of foreign-owned firms. Research by Mustapha (2011) on 235 companies in Malaysia conformed to Madura (2010) arguments. Foreign MNCs in Malaysia incur significantly higher monitoring costs than domestic companies. Although there is no significant difference between foreign MNCs and their domestic counterparts in terms of preference for specific types of monitoring mechanism such as directorship and auditing, foreign MNCs tend to have higher external audit costs than domestic MNCs.
Rescue acquisition hypothesis claimed that poorly performing domestic firms likely to add more foreign equity participation and lead to substantially high degree of foreign ownership (HFOD). The phenomenon of foreign acquisitions of poorly performing domestic firms has been observed in several emerging markets after Asian financial crisis in 1997 because Asian firms that were in dire need of capital for survival were willing to accept lower bid price from acquirers. Since it is unlikely that foreign owners could improve these poorly performing firms overnight after the acquisition, foreign-owned firms' performance will still lag behind domestic-owned counterparts at least in the short run period post-acquisition.
Past literature on ownership structure also identified some firm characteristics such as firm size (SIZE) and capital intensity that could potentially intervene or moderate the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance. Punnose (2008) found that larger firms tend to be more profitable, contradicted earlier studies by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) who found smaller firms tend to yield higher return than larger firms after adjusted for risk. Moreover, Hsiao (2003) concluded that higher capital intensity ratio (CAPI) indicates expansion of a firm's production and cash generating capacity, and it has a significant positive relationship with firm's profitability. Bernard and Jensen (2004) have consistent findings whereby firms that invest more funds in physical assets are less likely to bankrupt, contributed to lower cost of capital and higher firm value. In contrast, study by Maury (2005) found a negative relationship between capital intensity and firm's return on asset (ROA) because depreciation charges on capital asset investment reduce the firm's current financial year net profit.
Methods
This paper examines the effects of foreign ownership and presence of FDIR on the profitability of Malaysia listed companies over the period from year 1999 to year 2010. The selected sample period starts from financial year 1999 in order to avoid any distortion on firms' profitability caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the relaxation of FOWN cap to 100% only implemented in mid of year 1998.
Target population for this study encompasses all the 973 firms listed on main board, second board and Ace market of Bursa Malaysia as at 31st December 2010. From the target population, judgmental sampling method is adopted to select sample firms that meet certain criteria. Exclusion criteria for this study are: 5 companies that do not disclose the list of top 30 shareholders as such data are needed to compute the percentage of FOWN 6 companies diversified into multi-segments because segmented accounting in the annual reports do not divide different segments a firm involved in the same manner as the international standard industrial classification (SIC) code used by WVB database. (Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix), this study adopts fixed-effect panel data regression to examine the influences of FOWN and presence of FDIR on the profitability of Malaysia listed companies. Table A5 shows that p-values of both F-statistic and Chi-square statistic are 0.0000, which provide strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis that fixed effects of all selected listed companies are equal to each other. In other words, unique characteristics of companies that do not vary across time represent unobserved heterogeneity that influences firm's return on equity ROE for this research dataset of 4,176 firm-year observations. Since unobserved variables play important role in explaining the variation in firm's ROE, pooled regression model is not suitable. With Chi-square statistic p-value significant at 1% level (Table A6) , there is strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis that unobserved variables are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Since such endogeneity will make the estimators in the regression model to be inconsistent, it is inappropriate for this research to apply randomeffects regression model [Dougherty, (2007), pp.417-419] . Therefore, the fixed-effects panel data regression model is stated as equation (1) where µ it = α i + ε it , α i is the joint effects of unobserved variable on firm profitability, ε it it the error term, δ is the shift of intercept over time, i denotes each individual listed company in Malaysia, and t denotes each financial reporting year from 1999 to 2010. Variables in equation (1) are defined as follows:
1 ROE is net income divided by ordinary shareholders' equity, where net income equals to earnings after tax minus preferred dividends (Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy, 2009; Haslindar and Fazilah, 2011) . ROE is a more appropriate proxy of firm's profitability for its owners only because both ROA and return on capital employed (ROCE) measure the combined return for owners plus long-term creditors. Meanwhile return on sales (ROS) is affected by cyclical and seasonal fluctuations of sales volume in product markets. 5 FCHM dummy takes a value of '1' if the firm's chairman is a foreign resident or '0' otherwise.
6 FEXD dummy takes a value of '1' if the firm's executive director is a foreign resident or '0' otherwise.
7 SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm's total asset (Gilson, 1997) .
8 CAPI is total tangible asset divided by total sales (Sami et al., 2009; Kumar, 2004) .
The above fixed-effect panel data regression model will first be run on country panel of firm-year observations to test the following hypotheses, and then separately on five sub-panels of SIC-defined sectors. Hypotheses to be tested in this paper are as follows:
H1 There is an association between percentage of FOWN and firm's profitability.
H2
There is an association between percentage of FDIR and firm's profitability.
H3
The degrees of FOWN affect firm's profitability.
H4
The appointment of FCHM affects firm's profitability.
H5
The appointment of FEXD affects firm's profitability.
Both internalisation theory and resource-based theory predict that an increase in FOWN will lead to an improvement in firm's performance (positive coefficient for H1 and H3). According to internalisation theory, foreign owners can transfer and internalise their superior production technology and wider knowledge about international business practices to host country production facilities and local firms in which they own equity stake, thus resulting in lower operating costs and higher firm's profitability (Blomström and Kokko, 1998; Abor and Biekpe, 2007) . Besides that, foreign-owned firms tend to possess more tangible and intangible resources which are value-creating, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, such as more financial capital to invest in research and development and human capital (Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2000; Velde and Morrissey, 2003) . According to resource-based theory, these unique assets could then be converted into sustainable competitive advantages that contribute to superior firm's performance (Petaraf, 1993) . On the other hand, agency theory and rescue acquisition hypothesis expect that an increase in FOWN is associated with a decrease in firm's performance (negative coefficient for H1 and H3). According to agency theory, when foreign owners are not closely involved in day-to-day management of the company, i.e., separation of ownership and control arise, agency costs to implement various monitoring mechanisms increase and eventually reduce firm's performance (Madura, 2010; Mustapha, 2011) . Moreover, foreign major shareholders might also engage in exploiting domestic minority shareholders in order to fulfil their own interests, rather than fully committed to improve the FDI recipient firm's performance (McCombie and Thirwall, 1994; Ananchotikul, 2008) . Apart from that, rescue acquisition hypothesis observes the phenomena of poorly performed local firms attract large foreign shareholdings and it is unlikely that these foreign owners can make a miracle turn of poor performance into good performance in the short run (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) .
On the premise of upper echelons theory, the presence of directors and top management team with different nationalities and international experiences brings in different values, personalities and cognitions that help the firm to make strategic decisions in an increasingly complex global business environment (positive coefficient for H3). Increase in nationality diversity in the board and the top management team is positively associated with firm's performance (Nielsen and Nielsen, 2013) . In addition, increase in foreign or international experience among executive directors shows evidence of firm's performance improvement in the UK and Switzerland (Kaczmarek, 2009) as well as China (Giannetti et al., 2015) . Nevertheless, hiring of more FDIR could cause group conflict within the board that reduce firm's performance (Williams and O'Reilly, 1998) , especially when the number of different foreign countries from which these directors originated increases and enlarges cultural distances within the board and top management (Honing, 2012) .
On the other hand, appointment of FDIR weakens the board of directors' monitoring effectiveness, leaving the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders remain unresolved, increase in agency cost and decrease in firm's performance measure (negative coefficient for H4). This is because FDIR are less familiar with domestic country's rules, regulations and practices as well as frequently absent from board's meetings, making it difficult for them to challenge decisions taken by managers or evaluate their performance (Masulis et al., 2009; Hahn and Lasfer, 2015) .
Based on entrenchment theory, appointment of foreign CEO has negative effect on firm's performance (negative coefficient for H5). Firms with high foreign institutional ownership entrench themselves and exploit domestic owners by paying large remuneration and compensation package to their appointed foreign expatriate CEOs and directors, hence increase costs and reduce firm's profitability (Abrahamson and De Ridder, 2010; Hahn and Lasfer, 2015) .
Discussion of results

Frequency distribution of FOWN categories (HFOD, MFOD and LFOD)
Table A7 in the Appendix revealed that majority of the Malaysian listed companies have low degree of foreign ownership, averaged at 80.68% over the period 1999 to 2010. Companies with high and medium degrees of foreign ownership comprised only 9.10% and 10.22% on average over similar period. This is unsurprising given that Malaysia has the minimum 30% indigenous ownership requirement implemented since the New Economic Policy (NEP) which indirectly restrict foreign ownership. Transitions among foreign ownership categories over the years are quite insignificant. Compare year 1999 to year 2010, 2.89% of listed companies have migrated from low degree to high degree foreign ownership category and 0.53% have shifted from medium degree to high degree foreign ownership category. As a result, listed companies belong to high degree foreign ownership category increased by 3.42%, from 7.37% in year 1999 to 10.79% in year 2010. Table A8 in the Appendix portrayed the distribution of high, medium and low FOWN categories among the five SIC-defined sectors. Manufacturing sector has 11.42% of the firms belongs to high foreign ownership category, the highest proportion among all the five sectors and also the only sector higher than overall country average of 9.10%. This coincides with FIC and MIDA relaxation of FOWN cap on manufacturing sector companies to 100%. In contrast, TCUS sector has highest proportion of firms in low foreign ownership category, recorded at 89.25% which is above the overall country average of 80.68%. Services (14.86%), construction (13.19%) and wholesale trade (11.70%) were the three sectors that have higher proportion of firms belong to medium degree foreign ownership category compared to overall country average of 10.22%. Table A7 in the Appendix showed that on average only 5.46% of Malaysian listed companies have appointed a foreign resident as chairman over the period 1999 to 2010. However, there was a steady and gradual rise of foreigners holding chairmen hot-seats, from 4.47% in year 1999 to 6.58% in year 2010. On the other hand, appointment of FEXDs seems to be more prevalent among Malaysian listed companies, averaged at 11.62% over the period 1999 to 2010, which was more than double compared to the former. Distribution of FEXDs only fluctuated slightly within the range of 10.26% and 12.11% over the same period. Table A8 in the Appendix revealed that manufacturing sector has the highest appointment of FCHM (11.42%) and FEXD (25.97%) among all the five SIC-defined sectors, followed by services sector which recorded 8.11% and 13.56% respectively. In contrast, construction sector has the least appointment of FCHM (2.55%) and FEXD (1.89%). Manufacturing sector in Malaysia has the most foreign chairmen and executive directors is coincide with the fact that Malaysian economy mainly relies on manufacturing sector since 1970s and many MNCs that establish their subsidiaries in Malaysia mainly manufacture products to satisfy local and regional sales. These MNCs, which mostly managed by chairman and executive director expatriated from their parent company, were attracted to operate in Malaysia due to lower labour cost (prior to the implementation of minimum wage policy) and lower land price (prior to the property price hike since 2009). Table A9 in the Appendix described the mean values for the two key independent variables of this study, i.e., percentage of FOWN and percentage of FDIR. Over the period 1999 to 2010, mean FOWN and mean FDIR averaged 14.56% and 7.06% respectively in Malaysia. Interpret on a sector-by-sector basis, manufacturing sector once again stood out as the only sector that scored higher than overall country average, with mean FOWN of 17.26% and mean FDIR of 9.23%. Mean FOWN for all the five sector sub-panels were below 20% indicating that none of them can exert significant influence via voting rights. In addition, generally low mean FDIR might indicate low diversity of nationalities in corporate boardrooms.
Frequency distribution of FCHM and FEXD
Mean percentage of FOWN and mean percentage of FDIR
Panel data regressions
Referring to Table A10 in the Appendix, regression model defined in equation (1) above showed good model fit with the p-value of the F-test significant even at 1% level for overall panel and all sector sub-panels. Based on overall panel of 4,176 firm-year observations, all the explanatory variables together explained 37.37.76% of the variation in firm's ROE. On a sector-by-sector basis, adjusted R-squared range from the highest (42.76%) for manufacturing sector to the lowest (24.69%) for wholesale trade sector.
FOWN did not have any significant relationship with firm's ROE according to overall panel and sector sub-panels results, hence insufficient evidence to reject null hypothesis of H1. There was only a weak negative relationship between FOWN and ROE at 10% level for wholesale trade sector sub-panel. In contrast, FDIR presence had a significant positive relationship with firm's ROE based on overall panel and three out of the five sector sub-panels (manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade), consistent with upper echelon theory and the findings of Liargovas and Skandalis (2010) . Therefore, there was enough evidence to reject null hypothesis of H2.
Results from overall panel and manufacturing sector sub-panel showed some evidence of nonlinear relationship between FOWN and firm's ROE to reject null hypothesis of H3, consistent with findings from Greenaway et al. (2009) study in China. Coefficients for HFOD were significant at 1% and the transition from low degree to high degree foreign ownership category could generally increase ROE by 9.08% and specifically improve manufacturing company's ROE by 11.23%. Nevertheless, coefficient for MFOD was mildly significant at 10% level and the shift from low degree to medium degree foreign ownership category only yield additional 3.99% ROE. These indicate that foreign shareholders need dominant voting rights in a company to be able to improve the firm's profitability since significant voting rights are still insufficient.
Results from overall panel did not show any significant effect on ROE due to the appointments of both FCHM and FEXD. Nonetheless, results from sector sub-panels provided some evidence to reject null hypotheses of H4 and H5 at 5% level. Appointment of FCHM reduced firm's ROE in construction and wholesale trade sectors, whereas the appointment of FEXD pushed down firm's ROE in construction sector. These negative effects could possibly due to foreign chairmen and executive directors do not understand local business environment in Malaysia, or face difficulties to mesh different culture and management styles between their origin country and Malaysia.
Conclusions
Although mean percentage of FDIR of 7.06% might indicate low diversity on a company's board of directors, regression results had proven that their presence improved profitability. Being a harmony multi-ethnic nation, hiring of various indigenous and non-indigenous local individuals to hold director positions perhaps have already increased the degree of board diversity, albeit low diversity in terms of nationalities. Therefore, FDIR and multi-ethnic Malaysian directors could share new ideas, knowledge, expertise and valuable advises that help to improve their company performance, as predicted by upper echelon theory. Armed with the highest mean FDIR among all the five SIC-defined sectors, FDIR could actually help Malaysian manufacturing companies to penetrate and expand product sales back to their home (origin) countries in which they are familiar with. Larger product market base enables Malaysian manufacturers to enjoy economies of scale, leading to lower cost and higher profit. Expanding merchandise exports by Malaysian manufacturers have contributed to continuous balance of trade surplus for Malaysia over the years.
Since HFOD proven to increase firm's ROE significantly, foreign investors should increase their equity stake to above 50%. With low political risk in Malaysia compared to regional neighbours such as Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines, foreign investors are not advised to invite domestic owners as joint venture partners because MFOD did not bring significant improvement in ROE. When political risk is high, as in the case of China, Greenaway et al. (2009) found that FOWN in the range of 47% to 64% (joint ventures between foreign owners and local Chinese firms) positively affect ROA, but negatively affect ROA when foreign owners' stake increase thereafter.
Negative coefficients of FCHM and FEXD from construction and wholesale trade sub-panels and generally insignificant results from overall panel suggest that when a Malaysian company, especially in construction and wholesale trade sectors, wishes to appoint either a FCHM or a foreign chief executive director, it is advisable that the origin country of the foreign candidates has to be taken into consideration. According to Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) in Italy and Bilyk (2003) in Ukraine, foreign owners and directors from other regions (off-shore) showed significant negative effects on firm performance whilst their counterparts from the same region (non off-shore) did not exert any significant influence, possibly due to the former's lack of understanding of local cultural, social and business environment. Notes: ***, ** and *Denote the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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